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Abstract 
 
Geographically household heat product markets are limited to the area which is covered 
by the local district heating network. A relevant case exists where the district heating 
company can determine the price of its product without constraints from other firms and 
heat products. We test empirically whether the local prices of district heating are affected 
by the local heat product market shares of district heating companies. In addition we test 
the price effects of public ownership of plants and production shares of district heat 
companies. We use panel data which consists of 76 district heating companies in years 
1996 – 2002. The data includes market shares, joint production, district heating tariffs, 
production scale, and raw material input cost variables.  
 
The results indicate that pure competitive case is not prevailing in the Finnish district 
heating pricing. The production shares of district heat firms had generally a positive 
effect on the district heating price but shares in the local heat product markets did not 
affected price. Public ownership was not relevant factor in pricing. Estimates from 
proposed model of price dynamics showed that some competitive patterns are quite 
strong among the market participants. Firms’ pricing movements were sensitive - albeit 
stability preserving - to changes in other firm’s pricing decisions in preceding periods. 
Generally the results indicate that the Finnish district heat markets are non-competitive 
but entail price dynamics that are typical for stable oligopolistic markets.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The Finnish heat product markets consist mainly of electricity, district heating, light and 
heavy fuel oil, and fire wood. The market shares of these products were following in 
2003: district heat 49 %, light fuel oil 17 %, electricity 17 %, fire wood 12 %, heavy fuel 
oil 1 % and others 4 %.1 The market definition of a different heat product differs. For 
example electricity, light and heavy fuel oils each form a single market in Finland. But, 
the market of a district heating company is limited to the area which its district heating 
network covers. From the district heating company’s point of view heat product markets 
are limited to the area which is covered by the local district heating network and its 
competitors are other heat product offered in this area.  
Do also the household customers feel this way? The electricity markets have been 
deregulated since November 1998. Still, the local electricity network operator has the 
ultimate service obligation to the customers located its network area. The amount of 
household electricity users who have changed their electricity supplier is quite low only 5 
%. About 22 % have asked offers from other supplier but 17 % is still relied to the 
original supplier.2 Therefore, the electricity markets are not quite competitive after all. 
The amount of competition in light fuel oil markets depends on the amount of suppliers in 
the area, but compared to other heat products these markets are most competitive.  
Each of the heat products also demand different technology to be utilised. After the 
choice of a technology have been done it is not economically efficient to change between 
the heat products until the technology used wears out. Because, these heat product 
markets exist only in situations where the investment decision of a heating technology is 
done, the existence of these markets is difficult to catch trough empirical analysis. At the 
moment, the markets of household heat products are defined as independent of each 
other. In the article we test first whether district heat firm’s market share in the total heat 
product markets has effects on its pricing. This enables us to test indirectly whether this 
market independency is valid, i.e. do different household heat products act as substitutes 
                                                 
1 Energiateollisuus ry, (2005). 
2 Lindberg, Koskenrouta, & Timonen, (2003),16. 
 1
to each other. If substitution takes place then market shares should correlate with product 
prices. However, the product substitution may quite often be limited since the local 
district heat supplier is the only supplier on the area and also electricity companies have 
high market shares in the area they are located. The amount of competitors even in these 
enlarged markets is low.  
This observation raises the question whether the local district heating network gives a 
technological potential to non-competitive product specific pricing. Thus, a relevant case 
exists where the district heating company can determine the price of its product without 
constraints from other firms and heat products. Non-competitive local markets may be 
dominated by few or even by a single firm. Market share effect of district heat product 
markets on pricing is tested also in addition to plant scale and unit cost effects. 
Another interesting point is the amount of public ownership within the district heating 
companies. Since, the privatisation has entered to the energy markets also great amount 
district heating companies has been privatised. About half of the companies in the sample 
are in public ownership. Previous studies have illustrated that state owned enterprises are 
often instructed to pursue goals other than profit maximization such as setting prices 
below cost in order to increase local employment or to ensure affordable services to all 
customers. 3 Some of the management of a state owned utility might also be encouraged 
to maximize the amount of sales and size of a company in order to attain more 
appreciation. Therefore, we also tested whether the public owned companies pricing 
differ from the pricing of other companies. 
In the empirical analysis we use panel data, which consists of 76 district heating 
companies in years 1996 – 2002. The data includes variables like the market share, the 
production technology (separate or CHP), the district heat prices, the scale of production, 
and raw material input costs.  
The pricing of district heat differs strongly between companies with different market 
shares within the local heat product markets. The following two figures will give a slight 
                                                 
3 Sappington & Sidak, (2003a), 479 – 480. 
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insight to the data. The first figure illustrates the situation in companies with 20 % or 
higher market share in the local heat product markets. 
Table 1. Summary statistics of data: means and standard deviations (in  
parenthesis) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Average market share of 
district heat producers 
63 % 
(42.9 %) 
62 % 
(43.8 %) 
63 % 
(42.2 %) 
63 % 
(41.5 %) 
62 % 
(42.4 %) 
64 % 
(42.1%) 
65 % 
42.6 % 
Total market share in heat 
product markets 
12.4 % 
(10.1 %) 
12.4 % 
(10.2 %) 
12.4 % 
(10.2 %) 
12.4 % 
(10.1 %) 
12.4 % 
(10.1 %) 
12.5 % 
(10.1 %) 
12.6 % 
(10.2 %) 
Market share in blocks and 
terraced houses heat prod. 
mkts 
51.3 % 
(18.4 %) 
51.5 % 
(18.3 %) 
51.7 % 
(18.3 %) 
52.4 % 
(18.1 %) 
52.5 % 
(18.2 %) 
53 % 
(17.9 %) 
53.3 % 
(18 %) 
Number of public own 
companies 
35 34 33 33 33 33 33 
Energy tariff (€/MWh) 25.6 
(4.21)  
26.5 
(4.26) 
27 
(4.2) 
26.6 
(3.91) 
28 
(4.81) 
31.3 
(6.89) 
30.5 
(5.43) 
Total tariff for blocks and 
terraced houses 
38.7 
(4.99) 
39.5 
(4.94) 
40.2 
(5.12) 
39.5 
(4.71) 
41 
(5.22) 
44.2 
(7.22) 
44 
(5.36) 
 
Figure 1. The difference between energy tariff and estimated fuel costs in 
district heating companies which have 20 % or higher market share in the 
local heat product markets. 
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The figure gives a quite strongly increasing relation with profits and market share in the 
companies which market share is about 30 % or more. An interesting group is companies 
between 15 and 25 % market share. Their pricing or profit formation does not seem to 
have a straight pattern. It might be that these companies are large enough to attend the 
local heat product markets seriously and the profitability and pricing depends highly on 
the situation in the local markets. Some markets might be highly competitive and the 
price is set according to the marginal costs. Some publicly own companies might carry 
out pricing under marginal costs to maximize the use of district heating in the area. And 
in some markets the price level might be so high that district heating companies can earn 
high profits. Another interesting point is that district heating companies with less than 10 
% market share in the local heat product markets also has possibilities to earn high profits 
and that when market share decreases the profits increase. It might be that these 
companies have group of loyal customers who they can rely on and then they can 
maximize profits through production technology or pricing since the demand is almost 
constant or the elasticity of demand is high. 
 
Figure 2. The difference between energy tariff and estimated fuel costs in 
district heating companies with less than 20 % market share in the local heat 
product markets. 
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Finally our target is to analyse in details the product price dynamics between the local 
district heat companies. Although some firms may even be a single district heat producer 
in local markets their pricing policy is not independent of their local and non-local rivals. 
Mergers, entry and exit in local market have been quite active in Finnish heat markets 
since the mid 1990’s. Strategic pricing decisions and dynamics of market structure 
depends on competitors’ actions. Few producers on heat markets with similar plant cost 
structure refer to oligopolistic markets where product price correlation is high. Thus we 
test in details whether firms’ pricing depends on their rivals’ prices, price volatility, and 
changes in market shares.   
 
II. MODELLING PRICE SETTING AND PRICE DYNAMICS  
2.1. Background  
The empirical literature of industrial economics faces many practical problems albeit the 
theory of competitive and non-competitive markets is well established. The theory of 
relevant market is a nice example of this disparity. Basically the notion that low number 
of producers is located in the same geographic market producing different or identical 
varieties of the same product is all that the theory gives (Stigler & Sherwin 1985). 
However, empirically the problem of discovering the relevant geographical market is at 
least as vexing as that of discovering the relevant product market. Price discrimination 
allows oligopolistic or monopolistic firms to invade their competitor’s markets areas, so 
that the high degree of overlap and cross-hauling tends to obviate the usefulness of theory 
literature for practical applications (Elzinga & Hogarty 1973, Thisse & Vives 1988). In 
practice, the best guide is still good common sense and a detailed institutional knowledge 
(Kirman & Philps 1993).  
 
2.2. SCP –paradigm  
The case of district heat production is a quite easily defined as a relevant market with one 
commodity produced by low number of producers on separate geographic area. Basically 
we have to concentrate on the price data with Cournot’s principle: market prices should 
take the same level throughout with ease and rapidity. The empirical implementation 
focuses on the dynamics of prices and exogeneity of price setting. Thus if price 
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adjustment is rapid and other firms’ prices have small effects on particular firms price 
setting the market regarded as competitive rather than oligopolistic (Slade 1986, Spiller & 
Huang 1986, Bresnahan 1989). The relevant literature focuses on the notion of 
conjectural variation where theory predicts that one unit change in firm’s output leads to 
a change of iγ  in its competitors’ total output. Formally we have when allowing for 
price-setting conduct that 
 
     1)                                          tt it it
t
dp
itp c qdq
θ= −  
 
where ( Nt i )itp p q= ∑  is the market demand,  measures firm’s marginal cost, and itc
1it iθ γ= +  gives the measure of the competitiveness of oligopoly conduct. The case 
1   ( 0)it iθ γ= =  is implied by Cournot-Nash equilibrium in a one-shot game (or 
monopoly). 0   ( 1)it iθ γ= = −  indicates perfectly competitive behaviour (Waterson 1984, 
Kirman & Philps 1993).  
 
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm has been a much used workhorse in 
the empirical industrial economics (see e.g. Reid 1987, Cubbin 1988, Waterson 1984). It 
has been under hard pressure for decades but still many found it as a valid starting point 
for empirical market share and pricing analysis (Barla 2000, Slade 2004). Basically the 
paradigm states that after rearranging Eq. 1) a following relationship for firm’s price 
margin is relevant 
 
      2)                                    
(1 )i i i
i
p MC S
PC
p
γ
η
− += =  , 
 
where  the market price of industry’s output, p iMC  is the th firm’s marginal costs,  
is the firm’s market share of output, and 
i iS
η is the industry price elasticity of demand.  
Sappington and Sidak (2003) have constructed a theoretical model of public companies 
behaviour, assuming that company values both total incomes and profits. Public utility 
company maximizes following revenue function:  
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Where w (0,1) is the weight that public company gives to the income, n is the amount of 
goods supplied,   is company’s price for product and (0≥pi )pQi  is customers demand 
of product i at price p, which is set by company. The first term of the equation describes 
company’s total income i.e. price multiplied with quantity and the second term 
company’s profits. If w = 0 the equation describes a situation in a normal private profit 
maximizing company. 
When a normal profit maximising multi-product company sets price as was illustrated in 
Eq. 3.), a public multi product company sets price as follows: 
 
      4)                                   
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The pricing principle of public multi-product company is similar as private except for the 
fact that marginal costs are decreased with factor 1-w, which describes reduced aim to 
maximize profits. It follows that the public company favour pricing below costs, when it 
emphasizes more total sales and when demand is elastic. But then, if demand elasticity is 
constant, the public company sets the price below the marginal costs to all of the products 
with demand elasticity above 1/w. So, if w is 0.5 all products which have price elasticity 2 
or more are priced below costs.5  
 
                                                 
4  Sappington & Sidak, (2003a), 504. 
5 Sappington & Sidak, (2003b), 192. 
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From the econometric point of view relations described in Eqs. 2) - 4) are problematic, 
since all variables are more or less endogenous. They all form the market process 
simultaneously making consistent empirical estimation difficult. In this context we will 
not model district heating companies’ profits since we do not have direct observation for 
them.  Instead we decompose Eq. 2) in following form  
 
        5)                                  (  , , )i iP g MARKET SHARES C X= i i
 
where  is the product price of district heating company, iP  iMARKET SHARES  contains 
both variables for firm’s market share in local heat markets and output product share in 
local district heat markets,  is the (unit) cost for the firm, and iC iX  includes all other 
relevant variables that data allows for.  
 
2.2.1.  Econometric model   
 
In order to analyze firm’s market share effect on its price setting a following dynamic 
empirical panel data model is suggested (see Eq.6.). The model is a dynamic two way 
fixed effect model. The main interest lies in the effects of firm’s market share of heat 
markets ( ) and in firm’s production share of district heat (  on market 
tariff . If the firm has a market power then the prediction is that shares 
correlate positively with price levels. Also we pay attention to public owned plants. 
lnMS lnPRODS)
(lnEprice)
DPUB  is a  -dummy for the local public or state ownership of the firm. Firm’s 
output price level is determined also by many other variables. The main cost component 
of heat energy production is the raw material costs. The variable l  is a proxy for 
the not revealed firm’s material input unit cost. The variable is constructed from market 
prices of raw materials (e.g. oil and gas) and total usage of firm’s raw material inputs. 
The variable ln  describes the firm’s output capacity, i.e. how much the firm has 
produced energy per year (measured in GKW). Variable 
0 /1
nFUEL
SCALE
DJoint  is a dummy variable 
taking value 1 if the firm has joint production in some other form like electricity and heat 
(otherwise variable takes value 2). Some auxiliary variables are also included in the 
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regression.  is the firm specific variable for unobserved heterogeneity. ia tλ  is the 
common time effect for all firms describing the general business conditions.  
 
 
     6)      
1 2 3
4 5 6 7                          
it i t it -1 it it
it it it it it
lnEprice lnEprice DJoint DPUB
lnMS lnFUEL lnSCALE lnPRODS
α λ β β β
β β β β ε
= + + + +
+ + + + +
 
 
 
From the point view of consistent estimation the above fixed effects model (or its 
stochastic counterpart, random effects –model) is demanding. First, the inclusion of one 
period lagged endogenous variable in the panel models allowing for relevant price 
dynamics biases the LS estimates of model parameters. Second, to threat variables 
 as exogenous variables is not warranted. The 
firm has a full control over its joint production possibilities and production scale. Thus 
the firm’s pricing policy or the market price has effects on these variables. Similarly the 
causality between market share variables and heat tariff occurs most likely in both 
directions. If the firm has price setting power, then this has a feedback effect on its 
market share. Generally we can threat only the ownership and raw material unit cost 
variables as exogenous as their variability is most likely not affected by firm’s pricing 
decisions.  
,   and  DJoint lnMS, lnSCALE,  lnPRODS
 
Both these problems  - biases in dynamic panel models and endogeneity – can be handled 
with instrumental variable estimation methods since technically question is of violation of 
so-called orthogonality conditions, i.e. non-correlation between the explanatory variables 
and error term. Instrumental variable estimation (IV) and related generalized methods of 
moments estimation (GMM) build on notion wherein we can find variables that are 
correlated with lnEprice  variable but not with error term ε . Typically these are some 
variables outside the model and lagged values of right hand structural variables of the 
model.  
 
Next we use following estimation strategy. First we estimate the equation in the pooled 
form, i.e.   and i tα α= λ  reduces to single trend parameter. Next we estimate model with 
 9
IV method in panel form treating  and  as 
endogenous. Finally we use GMM to estimate panel model in two forms: with and 
without the above endogeneity assumption. Note that GMM estimation is based on the 
one way random effects model where time trend is treated as a explanatory variable.  
,   DJoint lnMS, lnSCALE, lnPRODS
 
The estimation is done for three different data cases since the data contains three price 
variables: the energy tariff ( , the total tariff for small houses , and 
the total tariff for apartment houses and blocks . The total tariff has been 
selected because it includes all company specific factors which affect to the prices such 
geographical factors and population density. Similarly we have three different variables 
for market share of district heat among heat products, i.e. . 
lnEprice) )SM(lnEprice
)A(lnEprice
SM AlnMS,  lnMS   and  lnMS
 
2.3. Price dynamics  
A more elaborated theory pays attention to dynamics of price setting in the repeated game 
setting. The much discussed “Folk Theorem” says in this context that in a stationary 
oligopolistic situation in which players are impatient all the “cooperative” solutions of the 
one period game are the Nash equilibria of the overall non-cooperative game. Empirical 
testing is awesome task in this context and the results are indicative (e.g. Slade 1995, 
1992, Gasmi et. al. 1992). Main econometric novelty in these papers is that firm’s price 
setting is a function of others firms’ lagged prices, i.e. 1(
N
it i jtj ì
p p p −≠= )∑  corresponds to 
dynamic game setting.  
 
Finally the cross-price dependence can be motivated by the fact that the firms’ face a 
random demand and they have an option of information sharing concerning their private 
(cost) information (e.g. Clarke 1983, Vives 1984, 1990, Malueg & Tsutsui 1998, Zhu 
2004). Basically results in this literature leads to formulations like  
 
      7)                     [ | ] ( )
1 ( 1)
N N
i j jj ì j i
E c c c
N
ρμ μρ≠ ≠= + −+ −∑ ∑   
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where ρ  is the correlation between firms’ costs indicating that firm’s unit costs (and 
price setting) depends on other firms’ costs (prices).  
 
2.3.1. Econometric specification  
Assume that price process of individual firm can be expresses as the following non-
homogenous first order difference equation  
 
       8)                                    , 1 , 1it i t j tP P cPα β − −Δ = + +   
 
where , 1 , 1
1
1
N
j t
j ì
P
N− ≠
= − ∑ j tP −  is the average price level of market excluding firm’s i  price 
at preceding period. The variable , 1j tP −  measures the firm i ’s response to other firms’ 
average pricing. We call it reference effect. In competitive environment it is expected that 
coefficient  takes zero or non-negative value. Coefficient c β  captures the dynamics and 
stability conditions of firm’s own pricing process since the solution for Eq. (8) is  
 
        9)                                       ,0 , 1
1(1 ) [ ]tit i j tP P cPβ αβ −= + − + .  
 
If 2 0β− < < and , 1[ ]j tcPα −+ 0>  then the price process over the firms is stable and 
positive long run price level exists. When 1β ≈ −  we say that firm’s pricing process does 
not have memory, and if , only the reference effect matters.  ,a c > 0
 
For view point of empirical testing the Eq. 8) is easily handled since , 1j tP −  is independent 
and pre-determined of . However itP , 1it it i tP P P −Δ = −  may influence , 1j tP −  causing 
endogeneity bias in OLS –estimation. The problem can be avoided with a modification 
typical to growth and convergence models, i.e.  
 
      10)                                        0, ,0 , 1i t i j t itP P cPα β ε−Δ = + + + , 
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 where  and 0 0it it iP P PΔ = − itε  is a IID error term. If the time points 0  are far 
enough, then 
  and  1t −
, 1j tP −  is independent of 
0
itPΔ , and , 1[ ]it j tE Pε − 0= .  
 
If the price variability is high in the industry, the representative firm may find it difficult 
set its own price. If the firm has market power and face uncertainty in price setting then 
the firm overprices its output but the noise component (uncertainty) reduces the incentive 
for overpricing (i.e. , where 2/P σ∂ ∂ < 0 2σ  is the price variability). For more details see 
Appendix 2. 
 
The price variability variable that excludes firm i ’s price is defined as  
 
        11)                             21 , 1
1[ ] ( )
1
N
t j j t j t
j ì
VAR P P P
N− −≠
= −− ∑ , 1− . 
 
Augmenting Eq. 10) with this gives  
 
         12)                             0, ,0 , 1 1[ ]i t i j t t j itP P cP dVAR Pα β ε− −Δ = + + + + , 
 
It is argued that in non-competitive case 0d < : increased price variability reduced price 
changes as (monopoly) firm’s gain from price increase comes less certain. The case 
 refers to competitive case wherein uncertainty is an exogenous cost factor.  0d ≥
 
Finally we augment the model with variable that measures the change in market power. 
Thus we add in model variable 0, 1 ,0 , 1i t i i tPRODS PRODS PRODS− −Δ = −  to measure the 
change in market share of firm during the time period from 0  t . We do not 
measure the change between periods 0  t  as the endogeneity between current period 
price dynamics and market share may be present.  Now 
o   1t −
o  t
 
         13)              0 0, ,0 , 1 1 , 1[ ]i t i j t t j i t itP P cP dVAR P PRODSα β δ− − −Δ = + + + + Δ + ε , 
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 The same data set is used to estimate Eq. 13) as was used for the pricing level Eq. 6). 
However in this context we do not use any cost or scale etc. variables as the firm’s 
relevant pricing decision information incorporates them in the market price variables 
, 1 1 and  [ ]j tP VAR P− t j−
1
, and in firm’s own price and market share history variables 
.  0 0, ,0 ,,  ,  and i t i i tP P PRODS −Δ
 
III. RESULTS  
3.1.  SCP model  
Panel models 
Table 2 and Tables A1-A2 in Appendix 1 give the results for different estimations with 
alternative data sets. We estimate the SCP-model for district heat price tariff, for total 
tariff for small houses (MS), and for apartment houses (A). Total tariff includes the taxes. 
Generally results are similar for different data sets. However results depend strongly on 
method used. We put more weight on  and  estimation results than 
on two other method alternatives. Model diagnostics show that OLS is not adequate 
approach (large BP-test and Fixed Effects test values).  handles only the bias 
problem in panel setting but like OLS it is based on the restrictive assumption of 
exogeneity. In the following we analyze the results in details in context of different 
explanatory variables.  
2FE
IVPANEL
E
GMMPANEL
GMMPANEL
 
Year. Time trend or time effects ( )tλ  are statistically significant in all estimations. 
Positive point estimate indicates that district heat tariffs have been increasing during the 
analyzed period.  
 
1
/MS/AlnEprice− . The significant lagged energy tariff implies that pricing is a dynamic 
phenomena and some adjustment is taking place in time. Point estimates range from 
 to 0.825  with average value of 0.426 revealing that it takes only some years to 
obtain steady state solution.  
0.175
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Table 2.  OLS and panel model estimation results for district heat energy  
                tariff in Finland (lnEpric . Number of firms e) 76N = . Years 1997- 
                2002,  (HCSE -corrected t-values in parenthesis).  .6T =
__________________________________________________________________________
2
9.461*  ( 1.65) 0.125  (0.188) -20.02*  (-2.72) -21.83*  (-2.24)
0.005*  (1.78) -  0.011*  (2.81)  0.012*  (2.35)  
0.695*  (16.22) 0.212*  (3.31) 0.416*  (5
FE E
IV GMM GMM
-1
OLS PANEL PANEL PANEL
Constant
Year
lnEprice
− −
.00)  0.388* (4.12)
0.029*  (1.71) 0.041   (0.97) 0.058*  (1.92) -0.156  (-1.29)
0.009  (0.80) 0.138*   (2.74) 0.011   (0.77) -0.130  (-1.18)
-0.014  (-1.37) 0.094   (0.57) -0.022   (-1.63) -0.004  (
DJoint
DPUB
lnMS -0.22)
0.103*  (5.04) 0.105*   (2.64) 0.164*  (6.54) 0.138*  (3.58)
-0.008  (-1.24) 0.380*  (2.92) -0.250*  (-2.41) 0.031   (1.25)
0.015*  (2.95) 0.038   (0.82) 0.026*    (3.50) 0.050*  (2.80)
lnFUEL
lnSCALE
lnPRODS
R 0.697 0.813 -
/ 2.16/-0.08 2.08/-0.05 -
125.71* - -
 164.75* -
2.73 92.81* 71.53*
2
IV
DW AC
BP
FIXED EFFECTS
Hausman/Sargan
−
−  
    
      
     *)  significant at 10% critical level or below 
 
    :  2-way fixed effect (2FE) panel data instrumental variable estimation (IV).    2FEIVPANEL
     Instruments: all exogenous variables (Year, DPUB, lnFUEL) and one year lagged  
     values of lnFUEL and endogenous variables (lnMS, DJoint, lnSCALE, lnPRODS).  
    :  Dynamic panel error components model GMM estimation.  GMMPANEL
                           Instruments: see above  
    :  Dynamic panel error components model GMM estimation with  EGMMPANEL
                           endogenous variables. Instruments: see above  
     DW/AC:  Durbin-Watson test statistics and estimated residual 1st order autocorrelation  
     BP:  Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (H0: no heteroskedesticity)  
     FIXED-EFFECT: Test for significance of firm specific and time effects (H0: no fixed  
                                   effects) 
     Hausman: Orthogonality test for valid instruments (H0: ) IVCorr(X ,ε)=0
     SarganIV:  Bhargava-Sargant test for instrument validity (H0: moment conditions are  
                      valid) 
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DJoint . This joint production dummy variable is not well determined across the 
estimations. Only in 5 cases of 12 some statistical significance is obtained. The parameter 
point estimates are positive in relevant cases. We conclude that joint production does not 
decrease district heat tariffs.  
 
DPUB . Public or state ownership does not decrease tariffs. Except for one estimation 
case this dummy variable takes non-significant value. Only in Table 1. with  
estimation we found positive and significant estimate.  
2FE
IVPANEL
 
/ /ln MS AMS . The market share of district heat of total heat production enters significantly 
only once in all estimations. Combining this result with results for DJoint  variable 
indicates that horizontal heat product integration does not affect district heat pricing.  
 
lnFUEL . The raw materials costs determine both in economic and statistical terms 
significantly the tariff level. Cost pricing rule is evident for heat power stations. However 
the input price elasticities are quite low ranking from 0.056  to . Long run 
estimates are at least twice larger. Measurement errors can cause partly the result but 
generally a low input elasticity is an implication of firm’s pricing power: output prices do 
not reflect fully the marginal costs.  
0.164
 
lnSCALE . Energy production theory and practice indicates that large plants are more 
effective, i.e. they can use scale effects to reduce marginal costs of output. However our 
results are somewhat mixed in this context. The scale parameter is statistically significant 
in 8 cases of 12 but we obtain both positive and negative estimate values. The sign 
depends directly on the exogeneity assumption. In estimations where scale of energy 
production is treated exogenous (OLS and PANELGMM) we obtain negative price effect. 
When treated endogenous, the scale of production increases heat tariffs. The former case 
refers to the competitive case. In the latter case higher prices are obtained with larger 
plants. If the large plant is a sole producer in district then the pricing refers to monopoly 
case. However a viable alternative explanation is that the large plants are less effective 
than the small ones. Typically these are public owned plants.  
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lnPRODS . The share of market that a firm has on the district heat production has a 
positive effect on the tariff, i.e. if the firm is a sole producer the energy price is higher 
than with many producers. This result is obtained with statistical significance in eleven 
cases of twelve (11/12). Parameter estimates range from 0.008 to 0.058 indicating that 
market power effect is not large. An increase in the firm’s market power from 50% to 
60% increases district heat tariff only in average about 0.60% in long run.  
 
Semiparametric models 
A more detailed picture of district heat product share effects on heat tariff are obtained 
with semiparametric regression estimate of Eq. 6). In this context estimation is done for 
different yearly observations with spline smoothing method. Now the product share 
effects on heat tariff are treated as a non-linear function . In this way we 
obtain a nonlinear curve estimate describing the tariff effect at different product share 
levels.  
(G lnPRODS )
 
     (6’)     
1 2 3
4 5 6                   ( )
it it -1 it it
it it it it it
lnEprice lnEprice DJoint DPUB
lnMS lnFUEL lnSCALE G lnPRODS
α β β β
β β β
= + + +
+ + + + ε+
 
 
 
The smoothing-spline approach is the solution to the following programming problem 
given by Greene & Silverman (1994 ). Choose λ  in such a way that a smooth estimate 
for  is obtained in minimizing the following penalized least-squares criterion ( )iG x
 
        15)                       
2
2 2
21
( )( ( )) (
bN
i ii a
d G t )y G x dt
dt
λ= − − +∑ ∫iX β        
 
where λ  is a fixed constant, and 1 .... na x x b≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ .  The variables in the model are 
defined as ,   it it it ity = lnEprice x = lnPRODS , and ’s are all other variables of the model 
that enter linearly. The model in Eq. 14) is estimated for each year separately.  
X
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Table 3. reports the results of linear part of the estimated semiparametric model. However 
the yearly tariff response curves to product share levels are more interesting. We find 
with Figures 3-8. that in years 1997, 2000, and 2001 a share above 30% has an increasing 
positive impact on tariff. Note that estimation was done with ln –transformed variables 
meaning that curve values below unit line correspond to negative tariff elasticity to output 
share, and values above unit line corresponds to positive point elasticity. In years 1998, 
1999, and 2002 tariff response is decreasing with increasing share. However reliable 
decreasing response estimates are obtained only for year 1999 since the specification test 
by Hastie and Tibshirani (1990) does not reject the linear model alternative for years 
1998 and 2002. Note also that linear OLS results for share variable  are not 
significant (see Table 4) in these years. In years 1997 2000, and 2001 OLS gives positive 
and statistically significant coefficient estimates for share variable. The year 1999 is only 
exception form this rule. Semiparametric curve estimate is decreasing and OLS estimate 
for  is negative. The result stem from the fact that district heat pricing went 
through some market changes in late 1990’s. Household electricity markets in Finland 
were opened to the competition in the 1st November of 1998. The more detailed effects 
of this act were analyzed in companion paper by authors (Linden & Peltola-Ojala 2005).  
lnPRODS
lnPRODS
 
In general semiparametric and cross-section OLS estimation results support the panel 
data estimation results. Increasing product market share has a positive effect on tariff 
price. Some yearly differences are found, especially for year 1999, and in some years like 
1997 and 2000 a share less than 30% leads to price decreasing response. However these 
year specific cases do not rule out the general result that non-competitive price setting is 
dominant in the Finnish district heat markets.   
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Figure 3. Semiparametric estimate with 95% CI’s of tariff response to  
                district heat product share, 1997 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Semiparametric estimate with 95% CI’s of tariff response to  
                district heat product share, 1998 
 
 
 18
Figure 5. Semiparametric estimate with 95% CI’s of tariff response to  
                district heat product share, 1999 
 
 
Figure 6. Semiparametric estimate with 95% CI’s of tariff response to  
                district heat product share, 2000. 
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Figure 7. Semiparametric estimate with 95% CI’s of tariff response to  
                district heat product share, 2001.  
 
 
Figure 8. Semiparametric estimate with 95% CI’s of tariff response to  
                district heat product share, 2002.  
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Table 3. Linear part of semiparametric cross section SCP -model (OLS estimation,  
                 HCSE – corrected t-values in parenthesis) 
 
1
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
0.516 *  (2.76) 0.417 *  (2.64) 0.249  (1.57) 0.964* (2.14) 0.037  (0.13) 1.14 *  (4.02)
ln 0.794 *  (15.04) 0.837 *  (15.91) 0.937* (16.26) 0.648* (4.86) 0.871*  (9.31) 0.639 *  (8.57)
Constant
Eprice−
int 0.036  ( 1.50) 0.086 *  (3.47) 0.047* (1.76) -0.040  (-0.99) 0.048  (0.92) 0.040  (0.95)
0. 003  (0.13) 0.038*  (2.22) -0.032* (-1.75 0.029  (0.91) 0.047 *  (-1.99) 0.021  (0.82)
ln 0.012  (1.16) 0.023*  (
DJo
DPUB
MS
− −
−
− -2.51) -0.007  (-0.63) 0.001  (0.08) 0.006  (0.47) 0.010  (-0.56)
ln 0.074 *  (2.98) 0.058*  (1.83) -0.038  (-1.50) 0.113*  (4.31) 0.195*  (5.31) 0.021  (0.46)
ln 0.009  ( 0.06) 0.006  (-0.52) 0.011  (0.99)
FUEL
SCALE
−
− − −
2
-0.018  (0.78) 0.057 *  (-2.14) 0.006  (0.17)
0.871 0.891 0.811 0.689 0.816 0.557
 &  4.95* 0.636 2.98* 5.58* 1.87 0.29
 &  B 14.42 * 16.73* 1498.11* 78.46* 12.33* 620.44 *
R
H T
J
−
    H & T: Hastie & Tibshirani (1990) (asympt.) specification test for semiparametric model, H0: model  
                is linear (F-type test with F(4,69)0.05=2.53)  
    J & B:  Jarque & Bera (1980) (asympt.) test for residual normality ( ) 2 0.05(2) 5.91χ =
 
 
 
Table 4. Cross section estimation of SCP –model (OLS estimation, HCSE –corrected   
                 t-values in parenthesis) 
1
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
0.432*  (2.11) 0.429*   (2.44) 0.307  (1.34) 0.949* (3.02) 0.083  (-0.29) 1.18*  (3.75)
ln 0.796*  (13.25) 0.847 *  (15.13) 0.937* (12.90) 0.611* (6.41) 0.875*  (9.76) 0.626*  (6.
Constant
Eprice−
−
29)
int 0.036  ( 1.07) 0.085*   (2.97) 0.036  (1.08) -0.017  (-0.34) 0.052  (1.05) 0.034  (0.55)
0. 002  (0.13) 0.040 *   (2.57) -0.027  (-1.36) 0.021  (0.72) 0.049 *  (-1.80) 0.023  (0.62)
ln 0.013  (1.03) 0.
DJo
DPUB
MS
− −
−
− 021*   (-1.91) -0.002  (-0.18) -0.003  (-0.19) 0.005  (0.31) 0.007  (-0.31)
ln 0.074*  (2.47) 0.054  (1.54) -0.033  (-0.94) 0.117*  (3.31) 0.192*  (4.15) 0.026  (0.38)
ln 0.017  ( 0.93) 0.009  (-0.62) 0.01
FUEL
SCALE
−
− − −
2
1  (0.57) -0.025  (-0.87) 0.056 *  (-2.05) 0.004 (0.089)
ln 0.024*   (3.02) 0.011 (-1.27) -0.022* (-2.14) 0.038* (2.97) 0.032*  (2.11) 0.006  (-0.36)
0.860 0.887 0.796 0.649 0.807 0.530 
& 21.88* 22.98* 1466.22* 7
PRODS
R
B J
−
− −
0.41* 11.33* 635.21*
   H & T: Hastie & Tibshirani (1990) (asympt.) specification test for semiparametric model, H0: model  
                is linear (F-type test with F(4,69)0.05=2.53)  
   J & B:  Jarque & Bera (1980) (asympt.) test for residual normality  ( ) 2 0.05(2) 5.91χ =
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3.2. Price dynamics models  
Tables 5a)-9a) give the price dynamics estimation results for all sample observations 
(N=76) over all possible yearly dynamics. Tables A5b) – A9b) in Appendix 1. give the 
results for sample that excludes all firms that have 100% market share in local district 
heat production (N=46). All the models were estimated with OLS –method.  
 
 
Table 5a. OLS estimation of 0 0, ,0 , 1 1 , 1[ ]i t i j t t j i t itP P cP dVAR P PRODSα β δ− − −Δ = + + + + Δ + ε ,  
               where  is year  1996 observations (N=76) (HCSE -corrected t- 0iP
               values in parenthesis). 
 
2002 1996 2001 1996 2000 1996 1999 1996 1998 1996
1490.82 *   (7.49) 2833.62 *   (8.69) 912.08*  (2.73) 1288.42 *   (6.48) 1409.68*   (6.72)
1.01*   ( 7.78) 1.12 *   ( 6.76) 0.51*   ( 3.34) 0.76*   (-7.85) 0.77 *o
Constant
P
− − − − −
− − − − − − − −
1
1
0
, 1
 ( 7.22)
47.98*   ( 6.58) 102.56 *  ( 8.26) 30.36 *   ( 2.42) -46.22*  ( 6.19) 52.66 *   ( 6.62)
[ ] 6.19  (0.77) 15.62 *   (1.66) 22.90 *   ( 2.04) 4.48  ( 0.87) 1.62  (0.31)
0.01  (0.51) 0.05 
t
t
i t
P
VAR P
PRODS
−
−
−
−
− − − − − − − − −
− − − −
Δ −
2
 ( 1.06) 0.02  (0.49) 0.03  ( 0.97) 0.01  (0.54)
,   & 0.533,    252.83* 0.548,    26.54* 0.181,    212.51* 0.491,    391.61* 0.466,    68.49 *R J B
− − −
    J & B:  Jarque & Bera (1980) (asympt.) test for residual normality  ( ) 2 0.05(2) 5.91χ =
 
 
Table 6a. OLS estimation of 0 0, ,0 , 1 1 , 1[ ]i t i j t t j i t itP P cP dVAR P PRODSα β δ− − −Δ = + + + + Δ + ε ,  
      where  is year  1997 observations (N=76) (HCSE -corrected t- 0iP
      values in parenthesis). 
 
0
1
2002 1997 2001 1997 2000 1997 1999 1997
1400.91*   (6.41) 2887.17 *   (7.05) 283.96  (1.20) 1950.41*   (4.32)
0.92 *   ( 6.62) 1.14 *   ( 5.05) 0.13  ( 1.24) -1.13*  ( 8.91)
44.88*   ( 5.72) 104.28*   (t
Constant
P
P−
− − − −
− − − − − − −
− − −
1
0
, 1
2
6.87) 7.17  ( 0.81) 71.10 *   ( 7.25)
[ ] 4.83  (0.62) 14.64*   (1.63) 22.53*   (-2.52) 0.16  (0.03)
0.01  (0.61) 0.05  ( 1.11) 0.02  (0.49) 0.02  (0.41)
,    & 0.455,   270.58* 0.444,   26.32*
t
i t
VAR P
PRODS
R J B
−
−
− − − − −
−
Δ − −
0.108,   9.98* 0.567,   696.49*
    J & B:  Jarque & Bera (1980) (asympt.) test for residual normality ( ) 2 0.05(2) 5.91χ =
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Table 7a. OLS estimation of 0 0, ,0 , 1 1 , 1[ ]i t i j t t j i t itP P cP dVAR P PRODSα β δ− − −Δ = + + + + Δ + ε ,  
         where  is year  1998 observations (N=76) (HCSE -corrected t- 0iP
         values in parenthesis). 
 
              
0
1
1
2002 1998 2001 1998 2000 1998
1279.49 *   (5.35) 2828.42 *   (6.02) 815.93*   ( 2.74)
0.83*   ( 5.37) 1.10 *   ( 4.57) 0.34 *   (2.46)
40.59 *   ( 4.74) 102.17 *   ( 5.86) 30.56 *   (2.81)
[ ] 2.57  (0.
t
t
Constant
P
P
VAR P
−
−
− − −
− −
− − − −
− − − −
0
, 1
2
32) 14.37  (1.53) 1.19  ( 0.14)
0.01  (0.58) 0.04  ( 1.05) 0.01  ( 0.42)
,     & 0.356,   325.22* 0.376,   25.78* 0.105,   10.55*
i tPRODS
R J B
−
− −
Δ − − − −
 
                  J & B:  Jarque & Bera (1980) (asympt.) test for residual normality  
                  ( ) 2 0.05(2) 5.91χ =
 
Table 8a. OLS estimation of 0 0, ,0 , 1 1 , 1[ ]i t i j t t j i t itP P cP dVAR P PRODSα β δ− − −Δ = + + + + Δ + ε ,  
         where  is year  1999 observations (N=76) (HCSE -corrected t- 0iP
         values in parenthesis). 
 
                             
0
1
1
0
1
2002 1999 2001 1999
1279.47 *    (6.51) 2713.73*    (8.64)
0.79 *   ( 5.34) 1.05*    ( 6.10)
40.43*   ( 5.63) 98.01*    ( 8.24)
[ ] 1.69   (0.21) 13.67  (1.42)
0.01  (0.48) 0.04   ( 1.0
t
t
t
Constant
P
P
VAR P
PRODS
−
−
−
− −
− − − −
− − − −
Δ − −
2
4)
,    & 0.443,    401.81* 0.554,    26.53*R J B
       
                                  J & B:  Jarque & Bera (1980) (asympt.) test for  
                                 residual normality ( ) 2 0.05(2) 5.91χ =
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Table 9a. OLS estimation of 0 0, ,0 , 1 1 , 1[ ]i t i j t t j i t itP P cP dVAR P PRODSα β δ− − −Δ = + + + + Δ + ε ,  
         where  is year  2000 observations (N=76) (HCSE -corrected t- 0iP
         values in parenthesis). 
 
                                       
0
1
2
2002 2000
1372.82 *    (5.05)
0.92 *   ( 5.91)
44.08*   ( 4.74)
] 5.21  (0.68)
0.12  (0.57)
,   & 0.335,    291.04 *
0
t-1
t-1
t
Constant
P
P
VAR[P
PRODS
R J B
−
−
− −
− −
Δ
 
                                     J & B:  Jarque & Bera (1980) (asympt.)  
                                     test for residual normality ( ) 2 0.05(2) 5.91χ =
 
 
oP . Own price dynamics variable was statistically significant in all cases except for year 
2000-1997 dynamics (Table 6a). The range of significant estimates was -1.14 - -0.51 with 
average of -0.93 excluding year 2000-1998 dynamics (Table 7a) that was positive with 
significant value of 0.34. The results indicate that own price memory effects are quite 
small in district heat pricing process. Pricing process is stable. No memory value 1β = −  
is inside the range of estimates but simple t-tests reject the hypothesis 1β = −  (not 
reported). The non-significant value for price memory for year 2000-1997 (Table 5a) and 
positive value of β  in year 2000-1998 (Table 7a) refer to the state induced competition 
incidence of the Finnish energy markets in late 1990’s.  
 
The results for sample excluding 100% market share firms (Tables A5b – A9b) are quite 
close to above ones. On the average the price dynamics has value of -0.95 but the range 
of estimates is somewhat wider (-1.46 - -0.55) than earlier. The induced competition 
effects for years 2000-1997 and 2000-1998 (Tables A6b-A7b) are clearly still observed.  
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1tP− . Market reference effects are statistically significant in all cases except for year 
2000-1997 dynamics (Table 6a). The low variability of heat tariff price makes the 
estimates for parameter c  to be quite large in absolute value. The range for significant 
estimates was -104.31 - -63.48 with average of -63.48 excluding year 2000-1998 
dynamics (Table 7a) that was positive with significant value of 30.56. The results indicate 
that firms’ react quite strongly to last period average market price. The impact is negative 
on firms’ prices changes. This means that long run stable price level is found and a 
convergence toward it is established (see Eq. 9). Excluding the monopoly firms from the 
sample (Tables A5b-A9b) changes the results to form where reference effects is not on 
average so big absolutely (-35.77) and the range of estimates is more narrow than earlier 
(-53.64  -  -18.54). The result indicate that if there are more than one firm on local district 
heat market the price reference effect is less than in the case were the monopoly firm are 
also present. Thus surprisingly the number of monopolies increases reference price effect.  
 
1[ ]tVAR P− .  The price volatility measure has a statistically significant coefficient estimate 
only in four cases for whole sample. In years 2001 - 1996/7 volatility effect on heat tariff 
is positive but in years 2000 – 1996/7 it is negative. However in sample excluding the 
monopolies we get seven significant estimates for price volatility. They are all positive. 
Thus an increase in last period’s price dispersion has an increasing tariff effect. This 
supports the competitive market hypothesis. Under marginal cost pricing increased 
uncertainty is a cost factor that increases output price.   
 
tPRODSΔ . Change in firm’s market share does not affect firm’s price dynamics. The 
estimate of  coefficient is only in one case statistically significant and it has a 
negative sign (Table A6b: 1999-1997). The result is surprising since we obtained with 
panel models above a clear positive product output share level effect on heat prices. The 
result can be explained in many ways. The shares may have been quite stable during the 
analyzed period. Thus only the level effect is then obtained. 
tPRODSΔ
tPRODSΔ  -variable may be 
redundant in the price dynamics model since price information contains all the relevant 
decisions information already.  
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3.3. Discussion  
A quite different picture of district heat markets enters from the price dynamic model 
results compared to the results of SCP panel data model. However some similarities exist. 
Less competitive are the local district heat markets more price responsive are the firms. 
Thus monopoly firms response quite strongly to the average level of tariff in their pricing 
policy. However the response is stabilizing the price process. The result indicates that 
firms are sensitive to secure their market shares and positions and they react also to 
market information outside the local relevant district heat markets. The increase in price 
uncertainty has only effect when monopoly firms are excluded from sample. This and the 
fact that change in output shares do not effect price dynamics - but share levels correlate 
positively with price levels - indicates that market structure of the Finnish district heat 
markets is stable. Only in period of 2000-1999/8 when the induced competition was 
introduced by the state the market was disturbed (see also Linden & Peltola-Ojala 2005). 
Estimates of model of price dynamics break down during these years and output share 
effects were non-typical.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION   
The results obtained from different estimations above indicate clearly that competitive 
case is not the prevailing one in the Finnish district heat production in years 1996-2002. 
Although some econometric problems were not fully solved (i.e. the lack of suitable 
instrumental variables and non-normal model residuals) the results are not secondary. 
Point estimates for parameter for variables lnMS, and  in 
pricing models together revealed features that are typical for non-competitive markets. 
Significant district heat price effect estimates were not found for district heat firm’s 
market share in the total heat product markets ( ). The result supports our 
assumption that the markets of household heat products are defined independently. 
However, the firm’s share effect of district heat product ( l ) markets on district 
heat pricing was found to be positive and statistically significant. The result was 
strengthened with yearly based semiparametric model estimations. The firms’ market 
shares in district heat production have an increasing or a non-decreasing positive effect 
on product tariff in all years, expect 1999. Plant scale effects ( ln ) were not 
   lnFUEL, lnSCALE, lnPRODS
PRODS
SCA
lnMS
n
LE
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unambiguously determined. Unit cost had positive, albeit small, effects on tariff prices. 
Tariff prices were not sensitive public ownership of plant but joint production had in 
some extension positive pricing effect.   
 
These non-competitive market results were partly challenged by model estimates of price 
dynamics. The change in firm’s market share ( PRODSΔ ) does not determine tariff 
movements. In addition price uncertainty effects supported the competitive market 
structure alternative. However firm’s pricing movements were very sensitive - albeit 
stability preserving - to changes in other firm’s pricing decisions in preceding periods. 
The special circumstances of year 1999, deregulation of Finnish energy markets, were 
clearly observed. The stable and rigid Finnish district heat markets were disturbed 
extensively by induced competition. However the stability was quickly restored. 
Generally the results indicate that the Finnish district heat markets are non-competitive 
but entail price dynamics that are typical for stable oligopolistic markets.  
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Appendix 1.  
 
Table A1.  OLS and panel model estimation results for district heat energy  
               total tariff in Finland for small houses . Number of  SM(lnEprice )
               firms . Years 1997 – 2002, 76N = .6T = (HCSE -corrected t- 
               values in parenthesis). 
 
2
5.321   (-1.61) 1.769* (4.63) -7.520* (-2.31) -6.401  (-1.43)
0.003*  (1.76) - 0.005*  (2.51) 0.004*  (1.68)
0.825*  (24.23) 0.242*  (4.42) 0.562* (7.69) 0
FE E
IV GMM GMM
SM
-1
OLS PANEL PANEL PANEL
Constant
Year
lnEprice
−
.562*  (7.07)
0.017   (1.14) -0.112  (-0.32) 0.037* (1.92) 0.017  (0.29)
-0.004   (-0.59) 0.017  (0.57) -0.033  (-0.36) -0.048  (-0.84)
-0.002  (-0.75) -0.029  (-0.67) -0.009* (-2.40)  -0.001  (-SM
DJoint
DPUB
lnMS
*
2
0.11)
0.056*  (3.89) 0.071* (3.05)  0.114   (6.97) 0.102*  (4.87)
0.003  (0.87) 0.195*  (2.44) -0.002  (-0.29) 0.004   (0.32)
0.008*  (2.51) 0.050*  (1.76) 0.016*  (3.64) 0.014  (1.61)
0.801
lnFUEL
lnSCALE
lnPRODS
R 0.881 - -
/ 2.31/-0.15 2.12/-0.06 - -
154.20* - - -
 84.70* - -
2.83 112.65* 82.20*IV
DW AC
BP
FIXED EFFECTS
Hausman/Sargan
−
−
   
    *)  significant at 10% critical level or below 
 
    :  2-way fixed effect (2FE) panel data instrumental variable estimation (IV).    2FEIVPANEL
     Instruments: all exogenous variables (Year, DPUB, lnFUEL) and one year lagged  
     values of lnFUEL and endogenous variables (lnMS, DJoint, lnSCALE,  nPRODS).  
    :  Dynamic panel error components model GMM estimation.  GMMPANEL
                           Instruments: see above  
    :  Dynamic panel error components model GMM estimation with  EGMMPANEL
                           endogenous variables. Instruments: see above  
     DW/AC:  Durbin-Watson test statistics and estimated residual 1st order autocorrelation  
     BP:  Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (H0: no heteroskedesticity)  
     FIXED-EFFECT: Test for significance of firm specific and time effects (H0: no fixed  
                                   effects) 
     Hausman: Orthogonality test for valid instruments (H0: ) IVCorr(X ,ε)=0
     SarganIV:  Bhargava-Sargant test for instrument validity (H0: moment conditions are  
                      valid) 
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Table A2.  OLS and panel model estimation results for district heat energy  
               total tariff in Finland for apartment houses A(lnEprice ). Number of  
               firms . Years 1997 – 2002, 76N = .6T = (HCSE -corrected t- 
               values in parenthesis). 
 
2
9.699*    (-2.68) 2.140*  (3.17) -15.591* (-3.24) -19.428* (-3.09)
0.005*  (2.90) - 0.009*  (3.53) 0.011*  (3.26)
0.702*  (15.14) 0.175*  (3.32) 0.439*  (5.
FE E
IV GMM GMM
A
-1
OLS PANEL PANEL PANEL
Constant
Year
lnEprice
−
35) 0.409*  (4.37)
0.021*   (1.71) -0.026  (-0.66) 0.046* (2.26) -0.003  (-0.04)
-0.004   (-0.59) 0.041  (1.19) 0.002  (0.23) 0.021  (0.31)
0.001   (0.13) -0.142  (-0.95)  0.007   (0.74)   0.011  (A
DJoint
DPUB
lnMS 0.78)
0.074*  (4.69) 0.086* (3.11)  0.116*  (6.69) 0.089*  (3.56)
-0.012*  (-2.51) 0.229*  (2.55) -0.029*  (-3.79) -0.018   (-0.94)
0.013*  (3.12) 0.058*  (1.77) 0.020*  (4.07) 0.019*  (1.81)
lnFUEL
lnSCALE
lnPRODS
2 0.725 0.838 - -
/ 2.26/-0.13 2.09/-0.06 - -
140.11* - - -
 137.45* - -
3.70 104.11* 80.66*IV
R
DW AC
BP
FIXED EFFECTS
Hausman/Sargan
−
−
 
*)  significant at 10% critical level or below 
 
    :  2-way fixed effect (2FE) panel data instrumental variable estimation (IV).    2FEIVPANEL
     Instruments: all exogenous variables (Year, DPUB, lnFUEL) and one year lagged  
     values of lnFUEL and endogenous variables (lnMS, DJoint, lnSCALE,  nPRODS).  
    :  Dynamic panel error components model GMM estimation.  GMMPANEL
                           Instruments: see above  
    :  Dynamic panel error components model GMM estimation with  EGMMPANEL
                           endogenous variables. Instruments: see above  
     DW/AC:  Durbin-Watson test statistics and estimated residual 1st order autocorrelation  
     BP:  Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (H0: no heteroskedesticity)  
     FIXED-EFFECT: Test for significance of firm specific and time effects (H0: no fixed  
                                   effects) 
     Hausman: Orthogonality test for valid instruments (H0: ) IVCorr(X ,ε)=0
     SarganIV:  Bhargava-Sargant test for instrument validity (H0: moment conditions are  
                      valid) 
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Table A5b. OLS estimation of 0 0, ,0 , 1 1 , 1[ ]i t i j t t j i t itP P cP dVAR P PRODSα β δ− − −Δ = + + + + Δ + ε ,  
       where  is year  1996 observations (N=41) (HCSE -corrected t- 0iP
       values in parenthesis). 
 
2002 1996 2001 1996 2000 1996 1999 1996 1998 1996
854.73*   (5.88) 1392.94 *   (6.22) 497.93*   (1.86) 716.30 *   (6.03) 807.18*   (5.44)
1.10 *   ( 6.18) 1.03*   ( 4.69) 0.55*   ( 2.48) 0.82 *   (-7.23) 0.76 *   (o
Constant
P
− − − − −
− − − − − − − −
1
1
0
, 1
5.33)
28.68*   ( 5.59) 53.64 *   ( 5.95) 18.43*   ( 1.77) -26.33*  ( 5.73) 30.29 *   ( 5.18)
[ ] 9.77 *   (1.67) 23.45*   (2.39) 0.97  ( 0.09) 0.28   (0.08) 2.44   ( 0.46)
0.01  (0.44) 0.03  (
t
t
i t
P
VAR P
PRODS
−
−
−
−
− − − − − − − − −
− − − −
Δ −
2
0.63) 0.01  ( 0.16) 0.04  ( 1.32) 0.01  (-0.01)
,   & 0.547,   309.00* 0.537,    3.36 0.159,   170.57 * 0.619,   25.69 0.484,   17.15*R J B
− − − − − −
    J & B:  Jarque & Bera (1980) (asympt.) test for residual normality ( 0.05(2) 5.91χ = ) 
 
 
Table A6b.  OLS estimation of 0 0, ,0 , 1 1 , 1[ ]i t i j t t j i t itP P cP dVAR P PRODSα β δ− − −Δ = + + + + Δ + ε ,  
          where  is year  1997 observations (N=41) (HCSE -corrected t- 0iP
          values in parenthesis). 
     
0
1
2002 1997 2001 1997 2000 1997 1999 1997
745.29 *   (4.40) 1292.44*   (4.37) 8.78  ( 0.21) 1324.25*   (7.94)
0.92 *   ( 4.41) 0.92 *   ( 3.23) 0.01  ( 0.03) -1.46*  ( 8.93)
24.92 *   ( 4.27) 49.81*   ( 4t
Constant
P
P−
− − − −
− −
− − − − − − −
− − − −
1
0
, 1
2
.50) 1.91  (0.22) 50.01*   ( 7.65)
[ ] 8.11  (1.32) 21.83*   (2.59) 9.50  (-1.36) 7.53*   (2.11)
0.01  (0.60) 0.02  ( 0.59) 0.01  (0.02) 0.04 *   ( 1.86)
,    &  0.387,   350.89* 0.403,     3.51 0
t
i t
VAR P
PRODS
R J B
−
−
− −
−
Δ − − − −
.05,    0.762 0.567,   21.08*
    J & B:  Jarque & Bera (1980) (asympt.) test for residual normality ( 0.05(2) 5.91χ = ) 
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Table A7b.  OLS estimation of 0 0, ,0 , 1 1 , 1[ ]i t i j t t j i t itP P cP dVAR P PRODSα β δ− − −Δ = + + + + Δ + ε ,  
          where  is year  1998 observations (N=41) (HCSE -corrected t- 0iP
           values in parenthesis). 
 
              
0
1
1
2002 1998 2001 1998 2000 1998
756.93*   (4.57) 1325.92 *   (4.77) 656.78*   ( 2.63)
0.94 *   ( 4.82) 0.96 *   ( 3.74) 0.41*   (2.02)
25.30 *   ( 4.04) 51.17 *   ( 4.87) 23.13*   (2.49)
[ ] 8.18  (1.32)
t
t
Constant
P
P
VAR P
−
−
− − −
− −
− − − −
− − − −
0
, 1
2
22.37 *   (2.61) 9.04    (1.37)
0.01  (0.55) 0.03  ( 0.62) 0.04  ( 1.27)
,    &  0.414,   375.71* 0.424,   3.65 0.213,   1.58
i tPRODS
R J B
−Δ − − − −
 
                 J & B:  Jarque & Bera (1980) (asympt.) test for residual  
                 normality ( 0.05(2) 5.91χ = ) 
 
 
Table A8b. OLS estimation of 0 0, ,0 , 1 1 , 1[ ]i t i j t t j i t itP P cP dVAR P PRODSα β δ− − −Δ = + + + + Δ + ε ,  
         where  is year  1999 observations (N=41) (HCSE -corrected t- 0iP
           values in parenthesis). 
 
                         
0
1
1
0
1
2002 1999 2001 1999
730.16 *   (4.77) 1321.81*   (5.95)
0.88*   ( 4.43) 0.94 *    ( 3.83)
24.33*   ( 4.51) 50.75*    ( 5.69)
[ ] 7.57   (1.20) 21.27 *   (2.13)
0.01  (0.51) 0.02   ( 0.68)
t
t
t
Constant
P
P
VAR P
PRODS
−
−
−
− −
− − − −
− − − −
Δ − −
2 ,    & 0.404,   424.11* 0.527,   3.83R J B
       
                             J & B:  Jarque & Bera (1980) (asympt.) test for  
                             residual normality ( 0.05(2) 5.91χ = ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31
Table A9b. OLS estimation of 0 0, ,0 , 1 1 , 1[ ]i t i j t t j i t itP P cP dVAR P PRODSα β δ− − −Δ = + + + + Δ + ε ,  
         where  is year  2000 observations (N=41) (HCSE -corrected t- 0iP
          values in parenthesis). 
 
                                       
0
1
2
2002 2000
935.75*   (4.82)
1.18*   ( 5.42)
31.35*   ( 4.70)
] 10.40 *   (1.69)
0.01    (0.39)
,    &  0.464,   291.86*
0
t-1
t-1
t
Constant
P
P
VAR[P
PRODS
R J B
−
−
− −
− −
Δ
 
                                         J & B:  Jarque & Bera (1980) (asympt.)  
                                        test for residual normality ( 0.05(2) 5.91χ = ) 
 
Appendix 2.   
 
Assume that true market price is noisy in a following way  
 
       (A1)                       2,    where  (0, ).v P Nε ε σ= + ∼                                                       
 
This means that at optimum the price is equal to expected market price and the quantity 
of supply to meet the demand must be set according to it  
 
      (A2)                                       * *[ ] :    ( ) .X
*E v P P D P X= = =     
 
However the firm faces here a problem: the true or actual demand is determined by 
. The firm must have some estimate of  or  to obtain the correct 
value of . Note that firm is able in average to set the price correctly. However risk of 
incorrect price setting is evident in any single event and the firm needs some “insurance” 
against it. The firm prefers small over-pricing to under-pricing as its target is to hedge 
against incorrect pricing.     
( )XD v ( )XD v [ ( )]XE D v
P
 
The derive correct or the risk preserving price we take 2nd order Taylor approximation of 
 around  ( )XD v *P
        (A4)                 
* * *1
2
* * * 21
2
( ) ( ) '( )( ) ''( )( )
         ( ) '( )( ) ''( )( ) .
X X X X
X X X
D v D P D P v P D P v P
D P D P D Pε ε
≈ + − + −
= + +
  2
      
 
Taking expectation of this one obtains 
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       (A5)                    
* * *1
2
* * 21
2
[ ( )] ( ) '( ) [ ] ''( ) [ ]
( ) ''( ) .
X X X X
X X
E D v D P D P E D P E
D P D P
2ε ε
σ
≈ + +
= +

 
 
This means that a price  exists with following properties if  0P 0''( ) 0XD P >
 
      (A6)                    
0 * 0 21
2
0 * 0 *
0 1 * 0 2 0 21
2
( ) ( ) ''( ) :
( ) ( )  with  
and
            
[ ( ) ''( ) ]  with  / 0.
X X X
X X
X X X
D P D P D P
D P D P P P
P D D P D P P
σ
σ σ−
= −
< >
= − ∂ ∂ <
 
The result gives the rationality for setting price above as long as *P 212 '' 0,XD σ >  i.e. the 
monotonic decreasing demand curve is convex for . The economic explanation for 
over-pricing rests on the idea of minimizing the risk of incorrect price. The firm having 
price setting power sets a price markup on market price in face of uncertain demand. 
However the increasing noise in price variability decreases over-pricing.  Figure 1 gives 
the graphical presentation of firm’s pricing policy:  
0P
 
              
Figure A1. Firm’s pricing under demand uncertainty:  
 
                                     '' 0 * 012 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0X X XD P D P D P= − > . 
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